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The new U.S. National Defense Strategy<\/a> released by President Donald Trump’s<\/a> administration is the first since 2022 and contrasts with its predecessor, issued under former President Joe Biden. Here’s a look at how the two Pentagon strategies address some of the traditional concerns of U.S. security policy. <\/p>\n 2022: \u201cThe United States derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful, and democratic Western Hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland. To prevent distant threats from becoming a challenge at home, the Department will continue to partner with countries in the region to build capability and promote security and stability.<\/p>\n \u201cAs in all regions, the Department will work collaboratively, seeking to understand our partners\u2019 security needs and areas of mutual concern.\u201d<\/p>\n 2026: \u201cWe will actively and fearlessly defend America\u2019s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. We will guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain, especially the Panama Canal, Gulf of America, and Greenland. We will provide President Trump with credible military options to use against narco-terrorists wherever they may be. We will engage in good faith with our neighbors, from Canada to our partners in Central and South America, but we will ensure that they respect and do their part to defend our shared interests. And where they do not, we will stand ready to take focused, decisive action that concretely advances U.S. interests.\u201d <\/p>\n 2022: \u201cThe Department will maintain its bedrock commitment to NATO collective security, working alongside Allies and partners to deter, defend, and build resilience against further Russian military aggression and acute forms of gray zone coercion. As we continue contributing to NATO capabilities and readiness \u2014 including through improvements to our posture in Europe and our extended nuclear deterrence commitments \u2014 the Department will work with Allies bilaterally and through NATO\u2019s established processes to better focus NATO capability development and military modernization to address Russia\u2019s military threat.\u201d<\/p>\n 2026: \u201cRussia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO\u2019s eastern members for the foreseeable future.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cEuropean NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and, thus, latent military power. At the same time, although Europe remains important, it has a smaller and decreasing share of global economic power. It follows that, although we are and will remain engaged in Europe, we must \u2014 and will \u2014 prioritize defending the U.S. Homeland and deterring China.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cFortunately, our NATO allies are substantially more powerful than Russia \u2014 it is not even close. Germany\u2019s economy alone dwarfs that of Russia. At the same time, under President Trump\u2019s leadership, NATO allies have committed to raise defense spending to the new global standard of 5% of GDP in total, with 3.5% of GDP invested in hard military capabilities. Our NATO allies are therefore strongly positioned to take primary responsibility for Europe\u2019s conventional defense, with critical but more limited U.S. support. This includes taking the lead in supporting Ukraine\u2019s defense.\u201d<\/p>\n 2022: \u201cThe NDS (National Defense Strategy) directs the Department to act urgently to sustain and strengthen U.S. deterrence, with the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) as the pacing challenge for the Department.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThe most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security is the PRC\u2019s coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.”<\/p>\n “The PRC\u2019s increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity towards Taiwan are destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. This is part of a broader pattern of destabilizing and coercive PRC behavior that stretches across the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and along the Line of Actual Control.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThe Department will support Taiwan\u2019s asymmetric self-defense commensurate with the evolving PRC threat and consistent with our one China policy.\u201d<\/p>\n 2026: \u201cWere China \u2014 or anyone else, for that matter \u2014 to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans\u2019 access to the world\u2019s economic center of gravity, with enduring implications for our nation\u2019s economic prospects, including our ability to reindustrialize. That is why the NSS (National Security Strategy) directs DoW (Department of War) to maintain a favorable balance of military power in the Indo-Pacific. <\/p>\n “Not for purposes of dominating, humiliating, or strangling China. To the contrary, our goal is far more scoped and reasonable than that: It is simply to ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies. This does not require regime change or some other existential struggle. Rather, a decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under, is possible.\u201d<\/p>\n 2022: \u201cThe Department will continue to deter attacks through forward posture; integrated air and missile defense; close coordination and interoperability with our ROK (South Korea) Ally; nuclear deterrence; resilience initiatives; and the potential for direct cost imposition approaches that come from globally deployable Joint Forces.\u201d <\/p>\n 2026: \u201cWith its powerful military, supported by high defense spending, a robust defense industry, and mandatory conscription, South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support. South Korea also has the will to do so, given that it faces a direct and clear threat from North Korea.\u201d<\/p>\n 2022: \u201cAs the Department continues to right-size its forward military presence in the Middle East following the mission transition in Afghanistan and continuing our \u2018by, with, and through\u2019 approach in Iraq and Syria, we will address major security challenges in the region in effective and sustainable ways.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThe Department will prioritize cooperation with our regional and global partners that results in their increased ability to deter and defend against potential aggression from Iran, for example by working to advance integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and irregular warfare capabilities. Working in concert with global and interagency partners, the Department will redouble efforts to support regional security coalitions within the Gulf Cooperation Council and among states in the region to ensure maritime security and improve collective intelligence and warning.\u201d<\/p>\n 2026: \u201cDoW will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel\u2019s efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump\u2019s historic initiative, the Abraham Accords. As we do, DoW will maintain our ability to take focused, decisive action to defend U.S. interests.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n